Chinese Navy live fire notice implications for national security (P#32)
Private company Frequentis provides communications for military and civilian aircraft as well as maritime traffic across Australia, New Zealand, PNG and Fiji, as stated on its Australian website at https://www.frequentis.com/sites/default/files/support/2019-07/35_REG_at_a_glance_AUS_0618.pdf . The website also says:
Our commitment to delivering world-class, safety-critical solutions tailored to the region’s unique needs and being close to our customers has made Frequentis a cornerstone of Australia’s critical infrastructure. As we celebrate 20 years of success, we extend our heartfelt thanks to our employees, partners, and customers. Your trust and collaboration have been instrumental in achieving this milestone.
This sounds lovely, but what went wrong? Chinese Navy ships, most likely with an accompanying submarine, circumnavigating Australia conducted live fire drills in an internationally recognised commercial flight path between Australia and New Zealand without issuing any NOTAM, and Australia’s military only found out about it from a Virgin Pilot monitoring an emergency frequency! What happened to Frequentis’s supposedly world class, safety critical solution! Did it malfunction, or was it selectively jammed, or transmission delayed, or data withheld?
If any of the latter occurred, then we and everyone serving in our armed forces is at risk, if critical data necessary for their survival and the protection of our country can be withheld, rendering our systems penetrated and therefore compromised. It’s a bit like Dr David Martin reporting that an Australian Army General told him not to rock the boat when the army was buying troop carriers with armour that had already been breached, because we couldn’t offend the (commercial interests of our) good ally we were buying them from, thereby endangering all our troops by purchasing defective stuff! If the software we’ve bought has been compromised, we need to do something, quickly!
Was somebody else supplying the critical bit of the system that was supposed to deliver an alert? Can it have been a system fault? I haven’t heard of any being reported, and Frequentis’s own website https://www.frequentis.com/sites/default/files/support/2023-04/Frequentis_COR_at_a_glance.pdf tells us that they are “Specialist for communication and information solutions for safety-critical control centres … with deep cross-industry experience in civil aviation, defence, public safety, public safety, public transport and maritime markets… (with) headquarters in Vienna”. The many awards they’ve won are also listed. So it can’t have been incompetence!
So the next logical question is whether Frequentis does any business in China? Well, its website at https://www.atc-network.com/atc-news/frequentis-strengthens-its-presence-in-china-by-taking-51-stake-in-amt-shanghai says it does quite a lot:
Frequentis is expanding its presence in China: the international active high-tech company has taken a 51% stake in AMT Shanghai. The deal for such a successful, established company secures Frequentis access to the strategically-important Chinese market… AMTs main customer is China MSA (the Maritime Safety Administration of the Peoples Republic of China). The intention is for AMT to also take on the logistical and maintenance tasks involved with existing Frequentis projects in China.
Frequentis has been active in the Chinese market since the middle of the 1990s. Its initial entry into China was in air traffic control, where the Austrian company is a global market leader: there are now around 40 Frequentis air traffic control systems in operation in the country. A particular project highlight in this context was the reequipping of the three area control centres in Beijing, Shanghai and Canton as part of the NESACC (Northern, Eastern and Southern China) programme. The company’s current market successes include two major projects in Hong Kong, where Frequentis is supplying the Chinese air traffic authorities with an electronic flight strip solution and an aeronautical information management system.
So, Frequentis is doing similar things in China as they are in Australia! That would mean the chances of supplying systems to the Chinese Navy would be rather high! There’s no separation in a communist country! If they are supplying software and/ or equipment to them, then who would they be giving priority to? The Chinese Navy or us?
One wonders how did they get into such a position? https://www.frequentis.com/en/about-us tells us that:
As a global player, Frequentis operates a worldwide network of branches, subsidiaries, and local representatives in more than 50 countries. Products and solutions from Frequentis can be found in over 49,000 operator working positions and in approximately 150 countries. Founded in 1947, Frequentis considers itself to be the global market leader in voice communication systems for air traffic control
So this means they are operating a worldwide operation, well beyond Australia and China that could potentially control all air and maritime traffic around the world from Vienna. We also know Austria is a neutral country, which means they supply Russia, another ‘enemy of the West’, as well as Europe. Who then do they answer to? What is their real agenda? How was this company able to gain such a monopolistic stranglehold on the world’s, and our own, passenger and freight transport? So, we need to look more closely at the relationship between Austria and China.
The now neutral Austria was the country where two world wars were generated. Hitler was Austrian. Frequentis was formed there in 1947, just after WW2. Many years later, a huge boost in trade between the two countries occurred after their Chancellor Sebastian Kurz took an enormous 250-person delegation from many Austrian companies to Bejing in May 2018, before he had to resign in disgrace for perjury, securing $Bs of contracts. Then the worldwide 5G rollout and C-19 pandemic followed simultaneously 18 months later. We now know the latter originated from China’s Wuhan Laboratory, and it just so happens that Pfizer’s vaccine development was done by Austrian company Biontec and that patents existed beforehand. It would be surprising if Frequentis was not part of that 2018 delegation. If it was, should Australia be getting a company providing operating capability for its biggest strategic threat to provide systems for our national defence and critical infrastructure?
At the very least, this abject failure of our seemingly second-class, below standard critical systems calls for an urgent review of exactly what Frequentis is delivering to Australia and the terms of all our contracts with them. Contract conditions need to be checked in our prime contracts and service level agreements as well, considering possible interactions with and between China, Austria and other entities. We need to know what data sharing occurs how, with and between, them and their customers. What is their own accountability to their own Austrian government? Do they have any effective internal ‘Chinese Walls’? Do the usual private sector non-rules apply = the highest bidder with the deepest pockets buys access to whatever data? Knowing their business with China, and that Chinese contracts generally come with an obligation to share data, should we even consider accepting assurances of internal ‘Chinese walls’? Do they operate on a borderless principle, simply corporately helping the world by supplying anyone willing to pay? Bearing in mind unsatisfactory answers in the Senate about the AFP training Hong Kong Police, what training is specified, and who is training whom about what! Who provides the management/ coordination over the top of these corporations? Anyone?
This all needs to be urgently investigated by someone knowledgeable in the Public Service, or somebody truly independent and not part of the same sort of grand, cosy, money-making schemes. Whoever does it needs to be familiar with complex contracts, awake to the private sector tricks that can be contained in contract terms, and able to recognise influence by suppliers cuddling up to and capturing their customers and investigators. The public and all of our defence personnel deserve a proper investigation, one that is public and open to scrutiny i.e. not whitewashed.